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Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity,
religion and morality are indispensable supports ... let it simply be
asked where is the security for prosperity, for reputation, for life-
if the sense of religious obligation desert.., and let us with caution
indulge the proposition that morality can be maintained without
religion. George Washington-Farewell Address'
There is often a message in a title. The title chosen for the Sym-
posium, "The Religious Foundations of Civil Rights Law," is no ex-
ception. Though the initial impression of its meaning will vary in
accordance with the interests of the individual reader, the basic
message of the Symposium is a simple one: law and religion are fund-
amentally related.
For much of our Nation's history, the close relationship among
law, morality, and religion has been taken for granted. In recent
years, however, the nature of the relationship has become obscured as
constitutional lawyers, judges, policy advocates, and, of late, politi-
cians have urged the separation of religion and public morality. 2
Thus, to the extent that overtly religious principles cannot be justified
on nonreligious grounds, their validity as a foundation for public pol-
icy has been called into question.3 In this view, law and public moral-
* © 1988 The Catholic University of America.
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1. D.H. MATHESON, HISTORY OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION UNDER THE CON-
STITUTION 569-70 (1941), quoted in C.J. ANTINEAU, A.T. DOWNEY, E.C. ROBERTS, FREE-
DOM FROM FEDERAL ESTABLISHMENT 188 (1964).
2. See generally R.J. NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE (1984). See also sources
cited note 14 infra.
3. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2854 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
("[Flar from buttressing his case, petitioner's invocation of Leviticus, Romans, St. Thomas
Aquinas, and sodomy's heretical status during the Middle Ages undermines his suggestion that
[the law] represents a legitimate use of secular coercive power."); Marsh v. Chambers, 463
U.S. 783 (1983) (justification of legislative prayer as "deeply embedded in the history and
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ity-what Robert Bellah has termed "civil religion" 4-should be
separated from traditional religion and "private morality"5 in the
same manner that "separation of church and state" attempts to di-
vorce the secular state from the concerns of religious institutions and
believers.
The choice of civil rights law as the symposium topic was, there-
fore, a deliberate one. Civil rights law is not only a critical issue of
public policy, it is also the primary context in which much of the
current discussion of the relationship between law and religion takes
place.6 Because, the relationship of civil rights law to religion, ethics,
and morality is complex and multi-faceted, it is an ideal place to begin
to explore the many levels the law influences, interacts with, and
draws support from religion, religious institutions, and religious
believers.
One thing is clear from the outset. By its very nature, the task of
exploring the relationship of religion to civil rights law is interdiscipli-
nary. Historians, sociologists, theologians, and philosophers, to name
only a few, have contributed much to the development of the theories
on which civil rights law is based, but legal analysis does not typically
seek out these perspectives unless they are useful in proving a dis-
tradition of this country"); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam) (posting the Ten
Commandments on the walls of public schools serves no educational function); Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 680, 687, 692-94 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) (justification of reli-
gious tax exemption on grounds that religious organizations "contribute to the community in a
variety of nonreligious ways"); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (justification of
Sunday closing laws on secular grounds). See also text at note 28 infra.
4. R.N. BELLAH, THE BROKEN COVENANT: AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION IN TIME OF
TRIAL (1975). Bellah has noted that "the question, and it is the most delicate issue of all, is
how the civil and noncivil religions are to be related." Bellah, Response in THE RELIGIOUS
SITUATION: 1968 389 (D.R. Cutler ed. 1968) quoted in J.L. CUDDIHY, No OFFENSE: CIVIL
RELIGION AND PROTESTANT TASTE 27 (1978).
5. Although "religion," "morality," and "private morality" are not conceptually the
same, the terms are used interchangeably in this paper to describe that which is, for legal
purposes, "nonsecular." For present purposes, however, it is sufficient to note that the courts
appear to use the terms interchangeably in some cases, and to differentiate them in others. The
treatment of these terms and concepts in the cases has provoked considerable commentary in
the legal literature, and would be an appropriate subject for another symposium. Choper,
Defining "Religion" in the First Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 579; Freeman, The Mis-
guided Search for the Constitutional Definition of "Religion ", 71 GEO. L.J. 1519 (1983); Green-
walt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 753; Johnson, Concepts
and Compromise in First Amendment Religious Doctrine, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 817 (1984).
6. Church-state controversies arising under the Religion Clauses of the first amendment,
U.S. Const., Amend. I, are generally litigated under federal civil rights laws prohibiting depri-
vation of rights "under color of any [state] statute, ordinance, regulation custom or usage," 42
U.S.C. § 1983, as are more general assertions that governmental action has deprived an indi-




puted point. The symposium which follows suggests a different ap-
proach: that it is useful for legal scholars and jurists to consider, on a
regular basis, the significant contributions that other disciplines can
make to legal analysis and understanding.
I.
When, in 1789, the United States Congress adopted the North-
west Ordinances, it recognized that "[r]eligion, morality, and knowl-
edge [are] necessary to good government and the happiness of
mankind."7 More importantly for present purposes, the Congress
drew a clear connection between the public's need for "religion, mo-
rality and knowledge," and the duty to assure that education-the
means by which they were to be acquired-was available to the citi-
zenry at large.8
To many Americans, the idea that religion and "private moral-
ity" are inextricably intertwined with public morality would be con-
sidered a truism. But the ideas concerning law, religion and morality
so eloquently expressed in George Washington's farewell address and
the Northwest Ordinances are not without controversy. To others,
Washington's words might be considered an inappropriate use of reli-
gion to make a political point-a point which could be made just as
effectively (or so the argument goes) by reference to purely secular
terminology.9 Whereas it once was possible for the late United States
7. Statutes of 1789, c.8 (August 7, 1789). In full, the Congressional sentiment was ex-
pressed as follows: "Religion, morality, and knowledge being necessary to good government
and the happiness of mankind, schools, and the means of education shall be forever
encouraged."
8. Id. Given this history, it is ironic that the primary area of legal conflict in matters of
law and religion has been over the role of religion in education. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguil-
lard, 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987); Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian Schools, 477
U.S. 619 (1986), rev'g and remanding, 766 F. 2d 932 (6th Cir. 1985), vacated on remand 802
F.2d 457 (6th Cir. 1986); Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind, 474
U.S. 481 (1984); rev'g, 102 Wash. 2d 624, 689 P.2d 53 (1984); Bender v. Williamsport Area
School District, 475 U.S. 534 (1986), vacating and remanding, 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984);
Ball v. School District of Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205 (1972); West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
9. Cf., Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 294-95 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring). But cf, Bellah, supra note 4 at 153-53 (arguing that the decoupling of technical
reason "from a larger religious and moral context" makes it impossible to stake out a sense of
direction). See generally R. NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE (1984); Louisell, "Does
the Constitution Require a Purely Secular Society?" in Symposium, The Interaction of Law
and Religion in the United States, 26 CATH. U.L. REV. 17, 20 (1976). Professors Gewirth and
Dougherty indirectly addressed the point made in the text in their description of the respective
roles of moral philosophers and religious leaders in influencing the direction of social thought
and policy. See Panel Discussion: Philogophical Perspectives, 5 J. Law & Relig. 149, 153-159
(1988).
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Supreme Court Justice William 0. Douglas to justify constitutional
policy on the ground that "We are a religious people whose institu-
tions presuppose a Supreme Being,"' 0 it is doubtful that either Con-
gress or the Supreme Court would utilize such overt references to
religion or morality to legitimate current policy. To do so today
would be far too controversial."
Thus, the task set out for each of the symposium participants was
to explore, from their own unique perspectives, the real and enduring
ways in which religious and moral ideas have influenced the develop-
ment of laws and legal concepts relating to civil rights.
The participation of religious institutions, leaders and individual
believers in the development, first, of a civil rights ethic, and later, of
civil rights law, is well-known in the American historical experience.
One need only peruse the cases and the history to discover the extent
to which the fuel of religiously motivated belief fed the fires of civil
rights activism.
Perhaps less well-known to legal scholars specializing in civil
rights law are the explicitly religious and moral foundations of the
very concepts and approaches utilized by legal analysts every day.' 2
The relationship between religion, morality, and civil rights laws at
this basic level is not often discussed in the legal literature. But there
is much to gain from such discussions: a rich intellectual tradition
which transcends the often sterile legal realism of much contemporary
legal scholarship;" a sense of historical and philosophical grounding
10. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 312-13 (1952). It should also be noted that Justice Doug-
las' views concerning people who take their religion seriously appeared to change by the time
he penned the following line in his concurring opinion in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
635-36 (1971): "One can imagine what a religious zealot, as contrasted to a civil libertarian,
can do [as a teacher] with the Reformation or with the Inquisition." Since there was no evi-
dence in Lemon that even one "religious zealot" was involved in the challenged program of
educational assistance, the use of the term "religious zealot" to describe a teacher in a relig-
iously-afliliated school says much about Justice Douglas' view of the relationship of religion,
education, and civil rights. Although one historian has drawn the conclusion that "[o]nly civil
libertarians, apparently, are fit teachers to be paid from the common treasury," MORGAN, THE
SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION 111 (1972) quoted in Louisell, supra note 10, at 23, the
implicit assumption is that commitment to strong religious beliefs is inconsistent with commit-
ment to civil liberties.
11. See, e.g., J.L. CUDDIHY, No OFFENSE: CIVIL RELIGION AND PROTESTANT TASTE
(1978). Judge John Noonan's remarks contrasting the respective approaches of Justices Jo-
seph Story and Oliver Wendell Holmes also casts light on some of the reasons for this develop-
ment. Concluding Panel Discussion, 5 J. Law & Relig. 240. See also sources cited at note 14,
infra.
12. See generally H. BERMAN, THE INTERACTION OF LAW AND RELIGION (1974).
13. See, e.g., Dougherty, Puritan Aspirations, Puritan Legacy, 5 J. Law & Relig. 109
(1988); Neuhaus, Nihilism Without the Abyss: Law, Rights, and Transcendent Good, 5 J. Law
& Relig 53 (1988) and Noonan, Principled or Pragmatic Foundation for the Freedom of Con-
[Vol. 5
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for the legitimacy of law and religion as a topic of public impor-
tance; 4 new conceptual frameworks with which to approach difficult
questions of public policy; 5 and an appreciation for the fact that
value-laden ideas are not religiously or morally neutral.' 6
But in order to appreciate the significant contributions which can
be made by moral insights and religious believers in a democratic so-
ciety which values civil rights, one must first study the significant con-
tributions which have already been made. Reference to those
contributions is essential if the legal community is to break out of the
intellectually inconsistent rut in which it finds itself with respect to
what might be called "private morality," religion, and the issue of
religious freedom as a civil right.'
7
That the contributions of religious ideas and moral theories are
not currently perceived as valuable by mainstream legal writers in the
civil rights field is apparent from a simple reference to basic textbooks
in constitutional law. Whereas page after page is devoted to commen-
tary concerning the important role of freedom of speech in a free and
science, 5 J. LAW & RELIG. 203 (1988). See also Sturm, The "Path of the Law" and the Via
Salutis: A Naturalistic Perspective, in Symposium, The Interaction of Law and Religion in the
United States, 26 CATH. U.L. REV. 17, 35 (1976).
14. On the role of religion and private morality in forming the attitudes of public leaders,
cf Berman, Conscience and the Law. The Lutheran Reformation and the Western Legal Tradi-
tion, 5 J. Law & Relig. 177 (1988) and Tierney, Religion and Rights: A Medieval Perspective in
5 J. LAW & RELIG. 163 (1988) with, e.g., Remarks of President Ronald W. Reagan to the
Ecumenical Prayer Breakfast, Dallas, Texas, August 23, 1984; Remarks of Walter F. Mondale
to the International Convention of B'nai B'rith, Washington, D.C., September 6, 1984; Gover-
nor Mario M. Cuomo, "Religious Belief and Public Morality: A Catholic Governor's Perspec-
tive" delivered to the Department of Theology, University of Notre Dame, South Bend,
Indiana, September 13, 1984; Representative Henry J. Hyde, "Keeping God in the Closet:
Some Thoughts on the Exorcism of Religious Values from Public Life," delivered at the
Thomas J. White Center on Law & Government, School of Law, University of Notre Dame,
South Bend, Indiana, September 24, 1984; Senator Edward M. Kennedy, "Faith and Free-
dom," delivered at Tavern on the Green, New York City, before the Coalition of Conscience,
September 10, 1984.
15. Cf Cahill, The Catholic Tradition: Religion, Morality, and the Common Good, 5 J.
Law & Relig. 75 (1988) and Cover, Obligation: A Jewish Jurisprudence of the Social Order, 5 J.
LAW & RELIG. 65 (1988) with, e.g., Remarks of Prof. T. Schaeffer, "Legal Ethics and the
Good Client," Brendan Brown Lecture Series, Catholic University of America, Washington,
D.C., October 3, 1986 (legal ethics); Destro, The Family and Public Policy in The Pope John
XXIII Medical-Moral Research and Education Center, The Family Today and Tomorrow 113-
129 (1985); Caplow, The Loco Parent: Federal Policy and Family Life, 1976 B.Y.U.L. REV.
709, 712.
16. See Gewirth, Moral Foundations of Civil Rights Law, 5 J. Law & Relig. 125 (1988),
and Neuhaus, Nihilism Without the Abyss.- Law, Rights, and Transcendent Good, 5 J. LAW &
RELIG. 53 (1988).
17. Johnson, Concepts and Compromise in First Amendment Religious Doctrine, 72 CALIF.
L. REV. 817 (1984).
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democratic society,"8 relatively little attention is given to the similarly
important role played by freedom of religion.19 In the opinion of this
writer, such neglect of basic principle goes a long way toward explain-
ing the fact that the nature of religious liberty as a civil right of in-
dependent significance is not as developed as it should be.2"
In the next few pages, therefore, it is appropriate that some atten-
tion be given to the manner in which the symposium papers and com-
mentary contribute to the ongoing development of a constitutional
and practical jurisprudence of law and religion.2' Individually and
collectively, they provide a wealth of information and ideas which can
be used profitably in the study of law.
II.
The task of setting forth even the most basic summary of current
constitutional theories regarding the "proper" relationship of law and
religion is a daunting one. It will not be attempted here. Rather, the
focus of these concluding comments will be on two key themes, each
of which was addressed, directly or indirectly, by all of the sympo-
sium participants: the importance of morality, religion, and religious
freedom as societal values having independent significance, and the
role of religious values in the formation of public character and
morality.
A. Religion, Morality and Religious Freedom as Values of
Independent Significance.
The important role of speech in a democratic society is almost
18. See, e.g., LOCKHART, KAMISAR, CHOPER & SHIFFRIN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 629
(6th ed. West 1986). ["The task is to formulate principles that separate the protected from the
unprotected. But speech interacts with too many other values in too many complicated ways
to expect that a single formula will prove productive.")
19. Cf id. at 1027. ["This chapter concerns the 'religion clauses' of the first amendment
... [and] attempts to accommodate [their] seemingly opposing demands..."]. It should be
noted in passing that most of the Court's jurisprudence in the area of law and religion has been
directed to explicating a "single formula" for resolving cases arising under the Religion
Clauses: "separation of church and state." Cf note 17.
20. See, e.g., Destro, Pastoral Politics and Public Policy: Reflections on the Legal Aspects of
the Catholic Bishops' Pastoral Letter on War and Peace, in PEACE IN A NUCLEAR AGE 356 (C.
Reid ed. 1986) reprinted, 4 J. Law & Relig. 25 (1987); Destro, Religious Freedom in the 1985
Supreme Court Term: Adrift on Troubled Waters, 6 RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORTER 481
(1986). See also Johnson, supra note 17.
21. See generally H. BERMAN, THE INTERACTION OF LAW AND RELIGION (1974); Sym-
posium, The Interaction of Law and Religion in the United States, 26 CATH. U.L. REV. 17
(1976). See also W. J. Wagner, Reflections on the Symposium: An Ordered Inquiry Into the
Relation of Civil Rights Law and Religion, 5 J. Law & Relig. 3 (1988).
[Vol. 5
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universally conceded. It was well-summarized by Alexander
Meiklejohn:
[What] is essential is not that everyone shall speak, but that every-
thing worth saying shall be said. . . . Conflicting views may be
expressed, must be expressed, not because they are valid, but be-
cause they are relevant. If they are responsibly entertained by any-
one, we, the voters need to hear them. [To] be afraid of ideas, any
idea, is to be unfit for self-government. Any such suppression of
ideas about the common good, the First Amendment condemns
with its absolute disapproval.22
Religion and what has been termed "private" morality, however,
are perceived differently. Notwithstanding George Washington's
laudatory views respecting the positive role played by religion and
morality in the development of good government, there is no current
consensus on the Supreme Court respecting the legitimacy of that
role.23 Because religion and religious freedom are generally perceived
in the cases and by legal commentators as matters of individual (i.e.
"private") rather than social concern, the legal conclusion is that gov-
ernment should take little or no active role in protecting and fostering
them as important values.24 Phrased another way, the dominant view
22. A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT, re-
printed in part in LOCKHART, KAMISAR, CHOPER & SHIFFRIN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 684-
86 (6th ed. West 1986).
23. In fact, it can be argued that a majority of the justices consider religious concepts of
the common good to be illegitimate bases on which to rest public policy, especially where the
result would conflict with their own opinions concerning the common good. Ever since the
Supreme Court decided Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), various members of the
Court have been struggling to set out the boundaries of what they consider to be legitimate
religious involvement in public affairs. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), for exam-
ple, the argument that religious involvement in political debates was of questionable legitimacy
had become what appeared to be an additional factor to be considered in judging the constitu-
tionality of legislation challenged under the Religion Clauses of the first amendment. See id.,
403 U.S. at 622-24. Although the decision in McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978), revg,
Paty v. McDaniel, 547 S.W.2d 897 (Tenn., 1977), and Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980)
constitute a rejection of the most extreme applications of that argument, the theme that reli-
gion as an influence on the development of public policy is politically divisive and constitu-
tional suspect runs like a strong undercurrent through the writings of Justices Brennan,
Marshall, Powell, Stevens, and Blackmun. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2854
(1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gy-
necologists, 106 S. Ct. 2169, 2187-88 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring); Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S.
Ct. 3232, 3239 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 348 (1980)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 329 (Brennan and Marshall, J., dissenting). See also Choper,
The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PITr. L. REV.
673 (1980); Gaffney, Political Divisiveness Along Religious Lines: The Entanglement of the
Court in Sloppy History and Bad Public Policy, 24 ST. Louis U.L. REV. 205 (1980); Ripple,
The Entanglement Test of the Religion Clauses-A Ten Year Assessment, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
1995 (1980).
24. See, e.g., Bender v. Williamsport Area School District, 475 U.S. 534 (1986); vacating
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is government must be "neutral" with respect to all matters involving
religion.25
The view that government policy must be separated from its reli-
gious or moral roots in both the development and implementation of
public policy, however, ignores a central point made explicitly by Pas-
tor Neuhaus, and implicitly by each of the other authors: "Law and
laws are not self-legitimating."26 By its nature, law is not neutral.
Something can only be declared legitimate by reference to some-
thing else .... It is without meaning to speak of morally legiti-
mate law except by reference to the good from which it is begotten
and to which it is accountable. Theories which attempt to explain
law and calculations of self-interest should assiduously avoid try-
ing to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate law. Of
course, such theories can address what is procedurally legitimate,
but they cannot address what is substantively or morally legiti-
mate. They cannot, in short, distinguish between what is legal and
what is right.27
To suggest, as one Supreme Court Justice has done recently, that
"traditional Judeo-Christian values . . . cannot provide an adequate
justification for [the law]" because "[t]he legitimacy of secular legisla-
tion depends instead on whether the State can advance some justifica-
and remanding, 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984); Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703
(1985); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Lubbock Independent School Dis-
trict v. Lubbock Civil Liberties Union, 669 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1155 (1983); Brandon v. Board of Education of Guilderland Central School Dist., 635 F.2d
971 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1981). But see 20 U.S.C. § 4071(A) (Equal
Access Act); Student Coalition for Peace v. Lower Merion School District Board of Directors,
776 F.2d 431 (3d Cir.1985). compare Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2496,
2504 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) ("The solution to the conflict between the
religion clauses lies not in 'neutrality,' but rather in identifying workable limits to the Govern-
ment's license to promote the free exercise of religion.")
25. See P. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW 18 (1962): Gianella, Religious Liberty,
Nonestablishment and Doctrinal Development-Part I, The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80
HARV. L. REV. 1381 (1967).
26. Neuhaus, supra note 16 at 53.
27. Id. (emphasis in the original). See also Gewirth, supra note 16 at 129. ("[L]aws are
presented as means to ends, including the stable regulation of social conflicts and the mainte-
nance of social peace. Morality, on the other hand, determines which ends are ultimately
justified and which modes of regulation and of peace are worthy of being established and
maintained .... Hence, it is through moral critiques that the rightness of such regulations is
determined."). Cf Faver, Religion, Research and Social Work, 12 SOCIAL THOUGHT 20, 22
(Summer, 1986):
Scientific research produces knowledge that can, in a limited sense, inform the means
of reaching valued ends. It cannot, however, determine or define the ends which
should be valued, nor, for that matter, can it determine the morality and appropriate-
ness of the means themselves. Thus, the "master stories" produced by scientific re-
search are incomplete pictures of reality, and social work needs knowledge beyond
that which science can provide.
[Vol. 5
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tion for its law beyond its conformity to religious doctrine,"28 is to beg
the question. All law is based on moral principles 2 9 and it is safe to
assume that in most cases there will be those who would apply differ-
ent moral principles to reach a different policy result. The important
task is to determine whether such laws can be justified as consistent
with both the rights of the individual and the community's best judg-
ment concerning the common good.3"
The point, of course, is that religion is an important source of the
moral values upon which all law is based. It is certainly not the sole
source of such values, as Professor Alan Gewirth's superb commen-
tary on the logical relationship of morals to civil rights persuasively
demonstrates,3' but it is important in its own right nevertheless.
Thus, it should be abundantly clear that religion and morality
play a role in society not unlike that of speech: they inform the debate,
and provide the basis on which laws may be legitimated. Protection of
religion and religious liberty must therefore be seen as an important
social interest as well, not simply because they implicate the freedom
of individuals, but because they play an important role in fostering the
development and dissemination of the moral ideals upon which the
28. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2854 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (sodomy
restrictions and the right to privacy). Justice Blackmun's views are a good example of the
manner in which the terms "religion" and "religious" are equated with the concept of "pri-
vate" morality in an attempt to distinguish them from that which is "secular" or "public." See
note 5 supra. See also Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,
106 S. Ct. 2169, 2187-88 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (protection of unborn from abortion
would be an illegitimate adoption of a religious view of prenatal life); Harris v. McRae, 448
U.S. 297, 348 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (abortion funding; "the Government 'puni-
tively impresses upon a needy minority its own concepts of the socially desirable, the publicly
acceptable, and the morally sound' "). See also CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE RIGHT TO
LIMIT CHILDBEARING, REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS
(April, 1975) at 28-29 (arguing that "[a]n anti-abortion law or constitutional amendment
would not pass [constitutional] muster" because of its basis in identifiable religious tradition).
29. See Dougherty, supra note 13 at 118-120 (discussing both religious values and the role
of social contract theory); Gewirth, supra note 16 at 125-131; Panel Discussion (Philosophical
Perspectives at 149 (Gewirth noting that "justice is primarily a moral, rather than a legal
concept.")
30. See Cahill, supra note 15 at 77-80 (Discussing the complementary relationship be-
tween individual rights and the common good); Cover, supra note 15 at 69-73 (the jurispru-
dence of obligation); Noonan, supra note 13 at 212 (values reflective of the human good);
Tierney, supra note 14 at 170 (of the 12th Century's "awareness of the balance between indi-
vidual and community"). Cf Letter of Thomas Jefferson to a Committee of the Danbury
Baptist Association, (January 1, 1802), reprinted in A. KOCH & W. REDEN, THE LIFE AND
SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 332-33 (1944) ("[Man] has no natural right in
opposition to his social duties"). See also Brown, Individual Liberty and the Common Good-
The Balance: Prayer, Capital Punishment and Abortion, 20 CATH. LAW. 213, 220 (1974). See
generally Harris v. McRae, supra, 448 U.S. at 319-20 (law is not unconstitutional because it
appears to be in conformity with one or more religious traditions).
31. Gewirth, Moral Foundations of Civil Rights Law, 5 J. Law & Relig. 125 (1988).
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law itself is based. An "absolute" separation32 of law from religion
would, as Washington noted, remove an essential support upon which
rest "the security for prosperity, for reputation , [and] for life."33
B. The Role of Religious Values in the Formation of Public
Character and Morality.
If one message is clear from the symposium papers taken as a
whole, it is that religious and moral values play an essential role in the
formation of public character, morality, and policy. Recognition of
this fact by the legal community, particularly legal scholars and
judges, would, in this writer's opinion, go a long way toward eliminat-
ing the rather fundamental suspicion of matters religious which ap-
pear in post-1948 cases and commentary.
Perhaps the most obvious place to start clearing up this suspicion
is to encourage greater scholarly attention to the contribution of reli-
gion to the protection of religious liberty itself. Professor Brian Tier-
ney's article points out, for example, that "in Medieval Christendom,
the resistance of the church always prevented national monarchies
from congealing into theocratic despotisms in which all individual
rights would have been extinguished. '3 4 Judge John Noonan's paper
recounts the contributions of early theologians, St. Thomas Aquinas,
Baruch Spinoza, and Roger Williams, to the development of a "prin-
cipled" as well as a "pragmatic" vision of freedom of conscience.3 5
And in the American experience, the influence of religious dissent in
the development of generalized concepts of religious liberty-includ-
ing freedom of conscience-is unmistakable.36
32. Although discussed at great length in legal commentary, the concept of "absolute"
separation is chimerical. The Jeffersonian metaphor of a "wall of separation between church
and state," which first appeared in his famous Letter to the Danbury Baptists, see note 30,
supra, is, in the words of the Supreme Court, a "useful figure of speech," but it does not
provide "a wholly accurate description of the practical aspects of the relationship that in fact
exists between church and state." The "wall" is, in fact, only a "blurred indistinct and variable
barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular relationship." Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1362 (1984), quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614
(1971).
33. Cf KELSEN, THE PURE THEORY OF LAW (M. Knight trans. 2d ed. 1967) (on law as a
coercive order); Machiavelli, Discourses Upon the First Ten Books of Titus Livy, Book One, XI-
XII, in THE PRINCE AND SELECTED DISCOURSES: MACHIAVELLI 104 (D. Donno trans.
1966) ("Where a fear of God is lacking, the state must either fail or be sustained by a fear of
the ruler which may substitute for the lack of religion.")
34. Tierney, supra note 14 at 167-168.
35. Noonan, supra note 13 at 208-210.
36. See, e.g., Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) (Unification Church); Thomas v.
Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division, 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (Jehovah's
Witnesses); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (Amish); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
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Beyond the contribution of religious ideals to freedom of con-
science is the immense contribution of religion and morality to the
development of laws and legal systems which undertake to protect
both the interests of the individual and the common good. Not sur-
prisingly, every moral viewpoint summarized in the symposium pro-
ceeded, not from a generalized concept of "rights," but from the
perspective of duty.37 That such an approach could have a significant
impact on current legal thinking in many areas was succinctly pointed
out by Professor Cover:
What have these stories [of Sinai] to do with the ways in which the
law languages of these respective legal cultures are spoken? Social
movements in the United States organize around rights. When
there is some urgently felt need to change the law or keep it in one
way or another a 'Rights' movement is started. Civil Rights, the
right to life, welfare rights, etc. The premium that is to be put
upon an entitlement is so coded. When we 'take rights seriously'
we understand them to be trumps in the legal game. In Jewish law,
an entitlement without an obligation is a sad almost pathetic
thing.3a
In contemporary American civil rights discourse, the concept of
duty is not well-developed, even though acceptance by some of their
social duties is central to the enjoyment of many rights by others.3 9
Perhaps the best example of this relationship of right and duty is the
398 (1963) (Seventh-Day Adventists); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (nonbelief);
United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944) ("I Am"); People ex rel Ring v. Board of Educa-
tion of District 24, 245 Il1. 334, 92 N.W. 251 (1910) (Catholic). See generally J. Madison,
"Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments" (1785) quoted in, Everson v.
Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 63-72 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (noting the need to
accommodate more than the views of "Quakers and Mennonists"); Little, Thomas Jefferson's
Religious Views and Their Influence on the Supreme Court's Interpretation of the First Amend-
ment, 26 CATH. U.L. REV. 57 (1976); M.MALBIN, RELIGION AND POLITICS (1978).
37. Berman, supra at 196-199 (Oldendorp's view that the "magistrates are ministers [i.e.
servants] of the laws" with a duty to do equity (Billigkeit) in every case); Cahill, supra at 77
(legally protected rights do not derive from government, but inhere in human nature and com-
munity; Cover, supra 67-69 (mitzvah; right follows obligation); Dougherty, supra at 119-120
(purpose of social contract theory was the grounding of rights and obligations); Gewirth, supra
at 135 (the "Principle of Generic Consistency: Act in accord with the generic rights of your
recipient as well as of yourself.") and Panel Discussion Philosophical Perspectives, at 157-158
(differentiating between "strict" and "nonstrict" (supererogatory) duties); Neuhaus, supra at
62 ("Democracy becomes a political community worthy of moral actors only when we engage
the question of the good."); Noonan, supra at 210 (Williams' view that freedom of conscience
is the manifestation of the duty of every Christian to follow the will of God as manifested by
Jesus Christ); Tierney, supra at 174 ("a concern for the moral integrity of human personality
led to the first stirrings of natural rights theories").
38. Cover, supra at 67.
39. Professor Gewirth described this as a "strict" duty. Panel Discussion: Philosophical
Perspectives, at 157-158.
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concept of "equal protection of the laws." If, as Neuhaus puts it, the
Supreme Court's current jurisprudence of civil rights holds that
"human rights are coterminous with the individual's ability to claim
and exercise such rights,"'  the law is in a difficult position indeed.
By its very terms, the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment 4' imposes a duty upon government to provide protection
on an equal basis.
While it is certainly possible to see such a governmental duty4 2 in
terms of "rights," it would be difficult to justify describing a right to
equal protection in the manner in which Professor Cover described
rights generally: as "trumps in the legal game."43 By definition, those
who most often attempt to invoke the protection of the legal guaran-
tee of equal protection are precisely the "discrete and insular minori-
ties" who are least able to enforce their claims without governmental
assistance. They hold no trump cards.
A jurisprudence of equal protection, like other topics discussed
in law and legal training which might be informed by a duty model,44
would not utilize the concept of "right" in the manner of a trump
card.45 Instead, it would proceed from the assumption that the duty
of equal protection is part and parcel of the " 'common good [which
is] to be shared by all members of the body politic,' "46 not because
40. Neuhaus at 57 (Referring to Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Cf Prof. Gewirth's
response to a question concerning the existence of duty to those who cannot benefit from it.
Panel Discussion.: Philosophical Perspectives, at 159-160. Cf, Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n,
476 U.S. 610 (1986); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hospital, 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626
(1986).
41. U.S. Const. Amend. XIV. By its terms, the equal protection clause applies only to the
several states, but the Supreme court has construed the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment, U.S. Const. Amend. V, as including "an equal protection component." See, e.g., Wein-
berger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 500
n.3 (1975); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). See generally Karst, The Fifth Amend-
ment's Guarantee of Equal Protection, 55 N.C.L. REV. 541 (1977); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &
J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 516-19 (1978).
42. The duty is also imposed by statute on certain classes of individuals for the benefit of
others deemed to be in need of protection. See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
29 U.S.C. § 621 (1982); The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1400 (1982); Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982) (prohibit-
ing discrimination in federally funded programs against those with disabilities); Title VtI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (prohibiting discrimination in employ-
ment on the basis of race, sex, national origin, and religion).
43. Cover, supra at 67.
44. Family law, the law of estates and trusts, and social welfare policy are good examples.
45. See, e.g., Local No. 93 v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063 (1986); Local 28 of the
Sheet Metal Workers' International Ass'n v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 106 S.
Ct. 3019 (1986); Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267 (1986); Firefighters
Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1985).
46. Cahill, supra, at 76 quoting John XXIII, Pacem in Terris (Peace on Earth).
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there is an abstract "right" to such treatment, but because it is the
only formulation of the concept of equality before the law which
"touches the whole man, the needs both of his body and of his soul."47
The benefits and applications of an interdisciplinary approach to
the problems of law and other disciplines4" can be multiplied almost
endlessly. Analysis of equal protection from a duty model is but one
example. The practical utility of the rich traditions of religion and
philosophy in the development of legal policy are amply illustrated by
the papers of Professors Cover, Gewirth, and Noonan, each of which
provides concrete examples of the manner in which they can be ap-
plied in a contemporary legal setting.49
The point, of course, is the same as that made at the beginning of
these comments: that law and religion are related in fundamental
ways which are directly relevant to the formulation and study of the
law. It is the hope of those who planned and funded the Symposium
that interdisciplinary interest in the topic of law and religion will
grow as the academic community begins to appreciate the substantial
47. Id. Cf, Gewirth, supra at 144-147 (discussing the difficult problem of preferential
treatment under the civil rights laws and its consistency with the Principle of Generic Consis-
tency) and Panel Discussion: Philosophical Perspectives, at 151-52 (same, indicating that the
civil rights laws are directed toward what is [sic] claimed to be submerged groups, especially
but not restricted to blacks and women."). See also Destro, Equality, Social Welfare, and
Equal Protection, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL. 51 (1985) (arguing that the civil rights laws are
focused on individuals rather than groups, and that a balance between the related, but distinct,
concepts of "civil rights" and "social welfare" can be achieved through a proper interpretation
of the duty of equal "protection" imposed on government by the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments to the Constitution of the United States).
48. See, e.g., Faver, Religion, Research and Social Work, supra note 27, at 22-23.
[I]f we are willing to go beyond the scientific method, to give up our faith in science
alone, we will discover that the great religious traditions, though much abused, have
within them the seeds of faith that is more adequate for our task. We will find alter-
native centers of value and images of power to guide our search for more adequate
explanations of reality. Our religious traditions ... force us to recognize our finite
human condition and the limitations of human knowledge-realizations that free us
to consider multiple types and sources of truth in our search for adequate "master
stories" or explanations of reality (see Imre, The Nature of Knowledge in Social
Work, 29 SOCIAL WORK 41-45 (1982)). Such a faith-with a central value of justice,
a reliance on the power of love rather than force or manipulation, and an openness to
multiple ways of knowing-will affect every stage in the process of knowledge devel-
opment for the profession. It will affect, more specifically, our formulation of
problems for study, our methods of seeking answers to questions, and our interpreta-
tions of the findings from our search.
49. Cover, supra at 72-73 (discussing Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 504-05 (1976) and
the "right" of a prisoner to appear in the courtroom without prison garb); Gewirth, supra at
144-147 (affirmative action and the Principle of Generic Consistency); Noonan, supra at 203-
204 (discussing the trial of St. Joan of Arc).
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impact it can have on the direction of law and policy." The practical
need for such research and cooperation is great, and the theoretical
questions are virtually limitless. Review of "The Religious Founda-
tions of Civil Rights Law" is an excellent place to begin.
50. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, n.l 1(1954) (psychological evi-
dence as basis for constitutional holding that "separate is inherently unequal").
